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outtakes and outrage:  
the means and ends of  
suicide terror
Samuel Thomas
Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief.
—Gospel of Mark, 9:24
For perverse unreason has its own logical processes.
—Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent
In his introduction to The Plague of Fantasies, Slavoj Žižek 
attempts a brief précis of "the antagonisms which characterize our 
epoch." Writing just before the most far-reaching and spectacu-
lar phase of the Age of Terror, and thus with some prescience, he 
begins to delineate some of the specific processes that have been 
brought to their extreme—often to the point of their collapse and/
or dialectical reversal—in our contemporary "audiovisual media." 
Among the numerous factors in play here, the tension between 
"world market globalization" and the assertion of various historical 
"particularisms" (ethnic, religious, national, linguistic) stands out as 
particularly significant in that it both binds together and immediately 
transcends the audiovisual focus of Žižek's project (1). Borrowing 
from Raymond Williams's well-worn formula of "epochal analysis," 
we can say that it extends into a bewildering variety of "dominant, 
residual and emergent" cultural forms (121). The processes through 
which the boundaries of the nation-state have become increasingly 
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porous and pliable—penetrated by networks of influence as diverse 
as the International Monetary Fund, tourism, flu viruses, drug traf-
ficking, sports franchises, and Al Qaeda—are matched by a series 
of appeals to origins and claims to self-determination, by the pull 
toward localized or sovereign political units and by the solidification 
of various so-called fundamentalisms. In fact, such is the intimate 
relationship between the two sides of this antagonism, which erupted 
to such spectacular effect in the Event of 9/11; it is often difficult 
(or just plain wrong) to separate them out. This, as Žižek contends, 
has placed many of the "paradigmatic critical procedure[s]" forged 
in "the good old days of traditional Ideologiekritik" under consid-
erable strain (Plague 1). And in the broadest possible terms, it is 
hard to argue. It requires no special kind of radicalism nor, for that 
matter, postmodern ennui to claim that the legitimacy of our modes 
of analysis have been called into question (and also, for better or 
worse, reanimated) by these violent upheavals in the contemporary 
life-world. I therefore begin in this rather expansive fashion with the 
opposite approach implied—a Žižekian switchover, if you will, a series 
of relays between the general and the particular, between the global 
and the local, between the macropolitics of the post-9/11 world and 
the micropolitics of the fictional text. More straightforwardly, I begin 
in this fashion because my topic demands it: the representation of 
suicide bombing and/or jihadist martyrdom; the theory and prac-
tice, as it were, of what Alex Houen has usefully termed "sacrificial 
militancy" ("Sacrificial Militancy" 113). Suicide bombing, in all its 
diverse and terrible forms, is a phenomenon that vividly dramatizes 
the most destructive possibilities of this interface between global 
and local forces, and for scholars of contemporary fiction, it is also 
the source of a significant outgrowth in discursive/creative practices. 
One of the underlying aims of my discussion here is to demonstrate 
that any critical treatment of this topic, whether directly or indirectly 
enmeshed in cultural politics after 9/11, must necessarily confront 
the simultaneous blurring and (re)inscription of boundaries that the 
suicide attack exemplifies in extremis.
This task is made all the more acute if we consider the proposi-
tion that the totality of global capitalism itself can be understood as 
developing from apparently closed, nationalistic forms of collective 
identity—an argument, for example, that underpins much of John 
Gray's Al Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern. The undisclosed 
symmetries between, say, laissez-fare corporate economics and the 
informal hawala banking systems that help to sustain the cross-
continental operations of terrorist cells provide a stern rebuke to 
any crudely sketched and insidiously conservative clash of civiliza-
tions—with Samuel Huntington's thesis famously reenergized in the 
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aftermath of 9/11—and to the "stupefying" belief that "modernity," 
and thus capitalism, "is a single condition" (1). Indeed, various ele-
ments of Gray's thought, his portrait of the complex, transnational 
interrelations between militancy, democracy, and the market, are 
perhaps unwittingly dramatized in one of the central texts I will place 
under scrutiny here—John Updike's penultimate and much-criticized 
novel Terrorist. This bestselling work, alongside Hany Abu-Assad's 
controversial film Paradise Now, will form the basis of the later stages 
of my investigation. The contrasting contexts presented to us by 
these works (Updike's New Jersey and Abu-Assad's Nablus, from the 
Free World to Occupied Territory), their contrasting receptions, and 
the dialogue between literary and cinematic aesthetics that such a 
comparison initiates, all combine to provide a uniquely instructive 
framework for coming to terms with what exactly is at stake in the 
attempt to fictionalize both the lure and the perpetration of suicide 
terror. Returning, however, to the specific way in which Updike's 
novel might reflect parts of Gray's influential thesis, we can observe 
how for the character Jack Levy—a lapsed Jew, insomniac, and soon-
to-be-retired high-school counselor—the "sense in the air, left over 
from '68, that the world could be reimagined by young people" has 
been replaced by something altogether more troubling and mercu-
rial (Updike 25). Before the routine dreariness of his existence is 
overturned by an encounter with an Arab American student who has 
committed himself to jihadist radicalism, Levy is quite evidently out 
of step with the sociopolitical landscape after 9/11. A new kind of 
ambiguity is "in the air," not only exemplified by the collapse of the 
World Trade Center—that searing, metonymic image of the United 
States temporarily brought to its knees—but by the destabilization 
of certain ideological boundaries and antagonisms described by Gray 
and Žižek. This, I would argue, is precisely what is revealed during 
one of his tired moments of introspection in the opening sequences 
of Updike's novel:
Even our much vaunted freedom is nothing much to be 
proud of, with the Commies out of the running; it makes 
it easier for terrorists to move about, renting airplanes 
and vans and setting up Web sites. Religious fanatics and 
computer geeks: the combination seems strange to his old-
fashioned sense of the faith-versus-reason divide. Those 
creeps who flew the planes into the World Trade Center had 
good technical educations. The ringleader had a German 
degree in city planning; he should have redesigned New 
Prospect. (27)
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In other words, if one were inclined to look for sound bites, one would 
assert that "Al Qaeda is a global multinational" (Gunaratna 11)—part 
computer geek and part religious fanatic in Updike's phrasing—both 
inseparable from and made possible by the very structures it pur-
ports to resist on "fundamentalist" grounds. Identifying Al Qaeda as 
such partly accounts for the intricate looping, the weird combination 
of closeness and distance, identification and disavowal, that char-
acterizes the mediation of (and response to) terrorist attacks. If, 
therefore, a diverse range of scholars—Gray and Žižek are of course 
rather strange bedfellows in many other respects1—provide us with a 
compelling and persuasive critique of the illusory gap that has been 
constructed between Islamist terror and technocratic (post)moder-
nity, then the profound confusion generated by the violent closing 
of this gap is communicated very efficiently by Levy's musings here. 
Moreover, we might also detect some echoes of the wounded but 
nonetheless very telling rhetoric of the 9/11 Commission Report—not 
only the much-heralded claim (via Paul Wolfowitz) about a "failure 
of the imagination" (Kean et al. 336), a failure to recognize that the 
hijackers were just as smart and technoliterate as the financiers 
and power brokers who populated the World Trade Center—but also 
those moments of acute, remorseful self-consciousness exemplified 
by the startling admission that "In a sense, they [Al Qaeda] were 
more globalized than we were" (340; emphasis added). 
Indeed, if Al Qaeda can be said to resemble "the flattened 
networks of virtual business corporations" (Gray 76), then Updike's 
notion of an untenable or "old-fashioned" divide between "faith" and 
"reason," a divide that a network of networks such as Al Qaeda super-
sedes, has further implications. There is surely a powerful truth in the 
detail that the suicide truck bomb that Levy eventually thwarts, the 
vessel that will deliver Hutama or "the Crushing Fire" (6), relies on 
the very "chemical deviltry" that—according to the novel's eponymous 
"terrorist"—makes "manifest materialism's spiritual poison" (75). This 
directly mirrors the way in which Islamist terror can, and perhaps 
must, be understood as the violent byproduct of the System it strikes 
against. The terrorist violence that announced itself to the world on 
9/11 is predicated and dependent on an advanced engagement with 
science, economics, global geopolitics, and the mass media. The terms 
of a superficially archaic conception of holy war, for all the strained 
portentousness of the jihadist idiom, are therefore firmly located 
within the mechanisms of late capitalism. And if Updike's observation 
teaches us nothing else, then there is a lesson of sorts to be gleaned 
from the simple fact that suicide terror is always, ultimately, a mat-
ter of living (and dying) through chemistry. Now, whatever failings 
Updike's novel might have—and the more serious of these, as well as 
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possible ways of "redeeming" elements of the narrative, will be ad-
dressed in due course—my analysis of these texts proceeds from the 
debates that are beginning to take shape here.2 To reiterate: bound 
together in a dialectical unity, the fraught interplay between the global 
and the local, between the abstract and the concrete, between "faith" 
and "reason," infinitely knotted yet often brutally clear, like the split 
second in which a liquid turns into a gas during a chemical explosion 
or a Boeing 767 hits a skyscraper, is what effectively structures our 
living experience in the contemporary sphere. 
Suicidal Tendencies
Both Terrorist and Paradise Now can be classed as attempts 
to inhabit and understand the desperate psychology of the suicide 
bomber. In short, they both attempt to explore the terrain of the 
apparently unthinkable—to empathize with the would-be martyr 
and murderer, to provide a comprehensive map of the conscious 
and unconscious processes that might lead a given individual onto 
an unstoppable, death-dealing path. Both narratives follow a termi-
nal trajectory (the aforementioned truck bomb driven by a fanatical 
teenager that concludes Terrorist, a suicide attack on Tel Aviv by two 
young Palestinians in Paradise Now) and, in doing so, both texts situ-
ate themselves very deliberately at the most dangerous intersection 
between the personal and the political. Both novel and film, for all 
their points of divergence, are concerned with the deep structures 
and destructive excesses of masculinity, belief, technology, deprava-
tion, and disillusionment. Both works have found themselves in the 
headlines, and both—this is the real value of the comparison I am 
proposing here—enact versions of the dialectical interplay between 
(superficially) oppositional and/or antagonistic forces that I have 
already begun to establish. Put another way, this discussion will 
explore—with modest but very specific aims—how there are always 
outtakes behind the outrage; how the "exalted and dread-filled con-
dition of the istishhādī" (Updike 250) has been aestheticized after 
9/11 in works from two very different but interconnected zones of 
conflict. Updike's novel owes its very existence to the 9/11 attacks, 
while Abu-Assad's film demonstrates how cultural engagements with 
terrorism after 9/11 are drawn, perhaps inescapably, into what Art 
Spiegelman has poetically called "the shadow of no towers"—with 
conflict in Palestine demonstrating the inseparability of local and 
global concerns better than any other issue of our time.
Before delving further into the minutiae of this comparison, 
however, it is necessary to continue with a broader, contextual ap-
proach—to articulate as fully as possible the general picture of suicide 
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bombing that will give way to particular representations of lethal 
force. In the decade since 9/11, the figure of the suicide bomber has 
become one of the definitive and most resonant archetypes of what 
Alain-Philippe Durand and Hilary Mandel have called the fictions of the 
"contemporary extreme." These fictions present "a world both similar 
to and different from our own: a hyperreal, often apocalyptic world 
progressively invaded by popular culture, permeated with technology 
and dominated by destruction," fictions that "do not merely reflect on 
violence" (distinct from, say, opportunistic and/or journalistic genre 
fiction) but "seek it out, engage it, and, in a variety of imaginative 
ways, perform it" (1). While one would struggle to make a convinc-
ing case for Updike (or indeed Abu-Assad) as a purveyor of any 
kind of extreme aesthetic, and even if the breadth of this category 
means that it remains worryingly difficult to formally distinguish 
between discursive and actual violence,3 Durand and Mandel's work 
is nevertheless a revealing attempt to map out a battle-scarred and 
ideologically-loaded sector of the collective imagination. At the very 
least, we are compelled to confront the uncanny sense in which the 
old simulacra that characterized certain versions of postmodern-
ism now have a cruel and dangerous kind of weight—exemplified 
by Žižek's oft-cited, though no less compelling reading of 9/11 as a 
moment in which "the fantasmatic screen apparition" explodes "the 
symbolic co-ordinates which determine what we experience" as real 
(Welcome 16). The indiscriminate harm wreaked on bodies, build-
ings, and infrastructure by the terrorist spectacle is accompanied, 
he insists, by a kind of virtual violence—"the shattering of our liberal 
democratic consensus" and the perverse logic of a permanent "state 
of emergency" that is allowed to function and flourish in the name 
of safeguarding democratic norms (Welcome 154). It is therefore 
curiously appropriate in this respect that the Qur'anic Arabic word for 
martyr,          or shahid, literally means "witness." Or in other words, 
the spectacular "martyrdom" of the suicide attack forces us to bear 
witness not only to jihad as testament, "uniquely transferable to any 
geographic or political context" (Burke 34), jihad as it is figured in 
the narrow frameworks inspired by ideologues such as Syed Qutb 
or in the militant branches of Salafi and Wahhabi Islam,4 but also 
to the delicate interplay between explosive fictions and explosive 
materialities. Thus, in cases of suicide bombing, we bear witness to 
the most primal forms of blindness, intractability, fear, horror, rage, 
despair, and panic (on one level, Terrorist and Paradise Now are born 
out of this grim cocktail). But at the same time, we bear witness 
to the underlying systems of cost and complicity that maintain the 
representational textures of global reality (in the precise sense of 
Durand and Mandel's "contemporary extreme" or Žižek's "symbolic 
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co-ordinates," the fictions that sustain, paradoxically, the hard and 
unbearable kernel of the violent Real). 
A memorable scene from Paradise Now demonstrates something 
of the spirit of this. In the film's final third, Khaled, one of the two 
young Palestinians to be recruited for a suicide attack on Tel Aviv, 
argues fiercely with Suha, a moderate human rights activist who 
has grown up away from the West Bank after her father (a resist-
ance hero named Abu-Azzam) was killed by Mossad. In this heated, 
claustrophobic exchange, which unfolds in the confines of a moving 
car at night, Khaled is challenged as to the validity of his belief in 
paradise—       or Al-Jannah—and he exposes the authentically 
tragic force of this bearing witness in his quickfire response. Even 
if mistaken, he claims, somehow both furious and melancholic (a 
double quality that attests to the excellent, complex performance of 
Ali Suliman), "I'd rather have paradise in my head than live in this 
hell." In the most desperate of circumstances, entombed in a termi-
nal environment, Khaled will surrender his own life (and the lives, 
potentially, of many others) to a process of metaphorical substitution. 
With this startling disclosure, what begins as an apparently straight-
forward argument between pacifist and militant opens up a sort of 
crack in the film's narrative—simultaneously exposing and effacing 
the precarious fault line that separates fact and fiction, certainty 
and doubt, the Real and the Symbolic. This fault line, I suggest, is 
the proper domain of the suicide martyr—a line across which violent 
truths and glorious fantasies are traded like hostages—and it is on 
that fault line, in his curious state of deeply shaken unshakeability, 
that Khaled is prepared to gamble everything. Retaining a relatively 
open-ended approach for a little longer then, it is by dwelling on the 
vexed relationship between discourse and violence that defines the 
so-called "contemporary extreme" that we can begin to understand 
how suicide terror, as an imagined, mediated, and material threat, 
now functions as one of the preeminent manifestations of globalized 
militancy after 9/11. There is something very apt and revealing, for 
example, in the career of former CIA agent Robert Baer, a man who 
has done more than most to soberly elucidate this issue (albeit with 
certain loyalties implicitly maintained) in his pair of documentary films, 
The Cult of the Suicide Bomber 1 and 2, made in 2005 and 2008. 
Following this pattern of metaphorical substitutions and switchovers, 
Baer has simultaneously had his own life fictionalized and marketed—
transformed into the quietly heroic Agent Bob Barnes for the George 
Clooney movie Syriana (2005). To talk of the interplay between text 
and terror in the case of suicide bombing is not, therefore, some ethi-
cally dubious postmodern game or theoretician's sleight of hand—the 
"relativism" (254) and "trademark cynicism" (255) that critics such 
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as Richard Wolin have angrily identified in philosophical responses to 
9/11.5 It is a question of mapping where the world begins and ends.
The Strength of Weaklings
How then do we proceed from this series of unstable, collapsible 
distinctions between the fiction and the reality of suicide terror? Let us 
take stock of how suicide bombing actually functions. Suicide terror is 
a practice that can not only shatter the rhythms of everyday life but 
also the most sophisticated machineries of governance and military-
industrial control. Indeed, it is precisely this practical malleability, and 
the way in which suicide terror can be endlessly adapted in terms of 
scale and context, that point to its symbolic and/or discursive ambi-
guities. The suicide attack, as Terry Eagleton writes, can be framed as 
both a symptom of "weakness" and as a theatre of "defiance" (90). 
It is a lethal sacrifice in which the categories of self-dispossession 
and self-assertion, of individual and collective power, are blurred 
together amid the awful intensity of the blast radius—just as the 
martyr's sacrificial body fuses the body of flesh and blood with the 
body politic. ("Our bodies," claims Sayeed, the other half of the twin 
suicide strike in Paradise Now, "are all we have left to fight with.") 
The decision to die as a suicide bomber is therefore not only "the 
solution to your existence, but also a commentary on it" (Eagleton 
90). The implications of this cannot be stressed enough. Far from be-
ing reducible to reified abstractions of fanaticism or fundamentalism, 
or to some facile opposition such as "McWorld versus Jihad" (Žižek, 
Welcome 42), we must recognize that suicide terror, as a local and 
global phenomenon, as mass murder, as desperate resistance, and 
as sacred martyrdom, is part of an intricate circuitry. It is absolutely 
singular yet near enough infinitely repeatable when understood as a 
strategic weapon; it is diffusely communicable in the sense that the Ji-
hadist call to arms can be spread through ever expanding information 
technologies and the terrible aftereffects of such actions broadcast 
across the globe (with 9/11 perhaps the supreme instance of this). 
But it is also incommunicable in the sense that the weird synthesis 
of negation and affirmation that defines suicide bombing brings us to 
the limits of what can be said, shown, and written; it is an assault, 
as I have already hinted, on "meaning as well as on materiality"; it 
is "spectacle as well as slaughter" (Eagleton 91).
It is these uniquely troubling qualities of suicide bombing that 
go some way to explaining why, as Mike Davis asserts, it is "not the 
more apocalyptic threats of nuclear or bioterrorism, that are produc-
ing the most significant mutations" in contemporary lifestyles and 
cultural politics. Rather, it is an "incessant blasting away" at "the 
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moral and physical shell" of metropolitan spaces from New York to 
Jakarta that is playing a decisive role here (7), as well as within the 
formal conflict zones that have come to define the age of the suicide 
bomber: Palestine, Chechnya, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, 
the list goes on. Indeed, the suicide attack, whether perpetrated by 
a lone individual or by coordinated groups, has now established itself 
as an insurgent tactic capable of matching, or at least confounding, 
the most advanced technologies deployed by the US, European, and 
Israeli militaries. From the hijacking of airplanes on 9/11 (the ultra-
violent extension of the grandstanding techniques pioneered by the 
likes of Leila Khaled and Carlos the Jackal) to the more modest use 
of plastic explosives strapped to the chest, suicide strikes are able 
to knock out "critical urban nodes" and "terrorize the population of 
entire cities" (5). Suicide bombers, in this sense, are the "quotidian 
workhorses" (7) of global terrorism and, however uncomfortable the 
debate might be, the strategic dimension of this practice cannot be 
ignored. As Baer explains while reflecting on the bombing of the US 
embassy in Beirut in 1983, the CIA has long recognized that suicide 
martyrdom represents the most fierce and terrible expression of "the 
strength of weaklings." It is "a tactic," he claims emphatically, and 
"not a cause" (Cult 2). Indeed, this point is made horribly clear by 
the rigorously planned attack that guides the narrative of Paradise 
Now. Jamal, the ambivalent "fixer" character who also operates as a 
respected community official—and possibly therefore affiliated with 
Fatah or Hamas—issues his instructions to the two would-be shu-
hada without breaking a sweat. The second bomber is to hold back 
until some minutes after the first has detonated his explosive vest, 
allowing more Israeli soldiers and the emergency services to arrive 
on the scene: "That gives us better results."
This instrumental matter of factness, however, does not do 
away with the deep ambiguities that I have started to sketch, and it 
is important to acknowledge the curious ways in which such attacks 
do not simply generate fear and disorder. Suicide terror is also im-
plicated in powerful forms of remade social identity that cut across 
the divisions inscribed by class, ethnicity, or religion that are so 
acutely expressed in the stratification of urban environments. In the 
indiscriminate nature of the attack, suicide bombers leave a trail of 
destruction and grief in their wake but at the same time unwittingly 
plant the seeds for temporary communities and unlikely camaraderie, 
for intrasubjective happenings that take on both a ceremonial and an 
unplanned, spontaneous quality.6 One only has to recall the scenes 
of collective defiance in the aftermath of the Madrid train bombings 
(thousands marching together, erroneously as it turned out, against 
the Basque separatist group ETA) or the countless instances of public-
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sphere cooperation in New York after 9/11 to witness the efficacy of 
this point. Indeed, as Žižek argues in his earlier, article-length version 
of "Welcome to the Desert of the Real," one can go so far as to find a 
strange kind of irony in the fact that, when New Yorkers commented 
on how "one can no longer walk the city streets safely," those very 
same streets were already well known as sites of danger and crime: 
"if anything, the attacks gave rise to a new sense of solidarity," ex-
emplified by images of young African Americans helping an elderly 
Jewish gentlemen across the street, a scene perhaps "unimaginable 
a couple of days previously," or restaurants opening their doors to 
emergency workers and so on (279). It would be naïve, of course, to 
invest too much in these newfound community ties. Prejudices are 
often depressingly quick to assert themselves, as Updike reveals in 
his novel's canniest insight into post-9/11 society. It is not only anti-
Arab or Islamophobic sentiment that can flourish unchecked (and 
unreported) in these circumstances:
The dozing giant of American racism, lulled by decades of 
official liberal singsong, stirred anew as African-Americans 
and Hispanics, who (it was often complained) "can't even 
speak English properly," acquired the authority to frisk, to 
question, to delay, to grant or deny permission to fly . . . 
To the well-paid professionals who travelled the airways 
and frequented the newly fortified government buildings, 
it appears that a dusky underclass has been given a tyran-
nical power. (46)
The concentration of both global and local forces in the act and af-
termath of suicide bombing, from the international crime networks 
used to smuggle explosives and forge passports to the micrological 
reconfiguration of community relations on a single street corner or an 
airport security queue, is made abundantly clear in such reflections. 
Even in Paradise Now, which generally refuses itself the elevated, 
bird's-eye perspective woven into parts of Updike's narrative, and 
which deliberately avoids representing the aftermath of the planned 
attack, the embeddedness of suicide bombing in a very living net-
work of connections and obligations is quietly but directly stressed 
(Jamal's seemingly heartfelt reassurances that the families of the 
two bombers will be well cared for and so on). 
Back to the Future
If, however, the material impact of suicide bombing corresponds 
with powerful alterations in the fantasy life of local and global cul-
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tures and in our narrative systems of representation, then it should 
be properly acknowledged that these aspects of the "contemporary 
extreme" are by no means without precedent. Similarly, while the 
figure of the Jihadist martyr undoubtedly occupies a central position 
in the contemporary imagination—the shahid, feyadeen, or istishhādī, 
the holy warrior, feared and revered, demonized and romanticized—
suicide bombing per se is by no means an exclusively "religious" 
phenomenon. Indeed, this fact is crucial if we are to properly resist 
the incalculably damaging and intellectually bankrupt verdict that 
suicide terror is a feature inherently "inscribed in Islam 'as such'" 
and instead understand today's acts of terrorism as "the outcome of 
modern socio-political conditions" (Žižek, Welcome 41). In fact, the 
incomprehension that continues to greet the act of Islamist suicide 
bombing in so much critical analysis and reportage is virtually inex-
cusable in the sense that the tactic has been widely employed across 
the turbulent history of the twentieth century—from Tamil or Kurdish 
separatists operating under loose rubrics of revolutionary Marxism 
to Japanese kamikaze pilots.7 It is also worth remembering in this 
respect that literary representation of suicide bombing begins with 
Conrad's indictment of anarchism (and indeed British governance) 
in The Secret Agent, his 1907 novel in which the hapless simpleton 
Stevie is blown to smithereens in a bungled attempt to bomb the 
Greenwich Observatory in London (a richly symbolic target that 
prefigures the media-savvy impulses behind the decision to attack 
the World Trade Center). Stevie, of course, is implicitly paired with 
a kind of dark double in the nihilistic and avowedly secular figure of 
the Professor, a feared terrorist who wears a detonator and flask of 
explosives on his person at all times.8 Fusing himself quite literally 
with this lethal device—a kind of proto-cybernetic mechanism—he 
transforms himself into a living weapon: "What is effective," the Pro-
fessor explains with chilling clarity, "is the belief those people have 
in my will to use the means. That's their impression. It is absolute. 
Therefore I am deadly" (92–93). Later, in the novel's concluding 
sequence, which has almost become a compulsory reference point 
for discussions of terrorism and cultural politics, we are left with 
these portentous words as the Professor disappears into the London 
crowds: "He passed on unsuspected and deadly, like a pest in the 
street full of men" (269).
The contemporary resonance of these words is hard to ig-
nore—we should not be overly fearful of anachronism here—and it 
is important to understand that both Updike's novel and Abu-Assad's 
film already belong to a cultural tradition of sorts.9 Furthermore, as 
Gray argues, while there are of course marked differences between 
fin de siécle and postmillennial political culture, organizations such 
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as Al Qaeda have far "more in common with these European revo-
lutionaries" than "anything in medieval times" (21), rightly insisting 
(as I have already touched on) that we understand radical Islamism, 
or the elements of Islamic faith used to frame and justify terroristic 
actions, as wholly and "unequivocally modern" (20; emphasis added). 
In a strange type of ideological loop, the most distinctive feature 
of terrorism today, "projecting a privatised form of organised vio-
lence worldwide" (Gray 1) can be found nowhere in the premodern 
past, certainly not in any kind of medieval caliphate, and finds its 
roots in both the revolutionary impulses and economic deregula-
tion that define the Western societies now celebrated as "liberal," 
"democratic," "tolerant," "secular," "permissive," and so on. It is in 
this precise sense, I think, that Derrida's reading of 9/11 as a kind 
of "auto-immunity disorder," a "double suicide" as he describes it 
(95), acquires the formal historical weight often missing from less 
sophisticated deconstructive approaches to this subject. Similarly, if 
we are tempted to understand globalization—or the international and 
intertextual relays in which I have tried to situate the act of suicide 
bombing—as a special property of the contemporary moment, then 
Conrad's nuanced and murky portrait of London reminds us otherwise: 
a great metropolis engorged by vast networks of colonial power, yet 
also a city incessantly breached by dangerous foreign imports and 
ideas (from Russian anarchism to the French pornography sold in 
Mr. Verloc's shop).
"Are we doing the right thing?"
With this simple but infinitely resonant question in mind (asked 
by Sayeed to Khaled as they wait to cross a security fence into Is-
rael, bomb vests concealed beneath their clothing), and with the 
theoretical and historical framework in place, I now turn to the ways 
in which both Terrorist and Paradise Now articulate the tensions and 
contradictions peculiar to the act of suicide martyrdom. Sayeed's 
nervous question casts a long shadow—longer even than the "shadow 
of no towers"—and it is within this shadow, I would suggest, that we 
must reflect on the creation of these two works that have chosen to 
"seek out" and in some senses "perform" (in Durand and Mandel's 
terms) the multilayered violence of suicide terror. More broadly, it 
is within this shadow that we must reflect on the grieving, violent 
societies in which these works were produced, especially so given 
the significant controversy they have generated and the questions 
they raise about the ethics (and indeed the limits) of representation 
in the post-9/11 world. 
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Terrorist tracks the radicalization of an Arab American teenager 
from New Jersey named Ahmad Ashmawy Molloy. Standing apart from 
"the cheerleader types and computer nerds, the Rastas and Goths, the 
wallflowers and do-nothings" (16) who make up the social ecology of 
Central High, Ahmad is a relentlessly pious and alienated loner—un-
swervingly dedicated to the "Straight Path" despite the temptations 
of the wayward Joryleen Grant10 and a decadent, morally bankrupt 
"popular culture of eternal music and beer" (23). He is drawn, with 
grim inevitability, into a truck-bomb strike11 on the Lincoln tunnel by 
a militant Yemeni Shaikh, "conceiving of himself as God's instrument, 
cool and hard and definite and thoughtless, as an instrument must be" 
(285). In a breathless Hollywood finish, however, Ahmad is eventually 
talked out of detonating his payload—twenty-five plastic drums of 
"ammonium-nitrate fertilizer and nitro-methane racing fuel" (283), 
"a work of modern art" (284)—which is capable of killing hundreds 
and causing massive infrastructural damage. He and many others 
are "saved" by counselor Levy, who uncovers the plot after becoming 
increasingly troubled by his A-grade student's decision to skip college 
and acquire a trucker's license, and who finds himself romantically 
involved with Ahmad's Irish American mother.12 Ahmad's Egyptian 
father, we are told, abandoned him at an early age, an index to the 
novel's underlying and ever present libidinal economy: "'He did this 
Allah thing all by himself,' explains his mother. 'I guess a boy needs 
a father, and if he doesn't have one, he'll invent one. How's that for 
cut-rate Freud?'" (117).
In contrast, Abu-Assad's Paradise Now follows two young Pales-
tinians, lifelong friends and natives of the West Bank town of Nablus, 
who are recruited to perpetrate a suicide attack in Tel Aviv. With the 
dead-eyed yet charming Jamal in the role of overseer, we discover 
that Sayeed and Khaled have been monitored for almost two years 
before being granted the "honor" of a suicide mission. This vetting 
process takes on an extra dimension after it is revealed that Sayeed's 
father has been executed for collaborating with the Israelis, and it 
is testament to the fact that both works locate themselves—despite 
the fact "Islam excludes God from the domain of paternal logic" 
and presents a considerable problem for Freud's theory of religion 
(Žižek, In Defense 114)—in a thoroughly Oedipal universe.13 With 
every aspect of the attack in place, however, the old axiom about 
best laid plans quickly asserts itself and the narrative descends into 
a tense series of escapes, manhunts, and stand-offs as doubt takes 
hold of the two bombers. Both of these works therefore project a kind 
of investigative seriousness and, crucially, an overt commitment to 
a sense of psychological-sociological depth while at the same time 
drawing heavily on the conventions of the popular thriller—a point of 
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cross pollination, it would seem, between literary and filmic aesthet-
ics. Both have attracted a heady mixture of praise, condemnation, 
and, in Updike's case, open derision. The Oscar nomination handed 
to Paradise Now (the film ultimately lost out to Gavin Hood's Tsotsi) 
sparked furious editorials, accusations of anti-Semitism, online cam-
paigns, and picketing on the streets of Los Angeles. Terrorist, on 
the other hand, was publicly rubbished by a number of prominent 
novelists—including Mohsin Hamid, the author, most notably, of The 
Reluctant Fundamentalist (2007), and Salman Rushdie, who memo-
rably described it as "beyond awful" in The Guardian. "He should 
stay in his parochial neighbourhood," Rushdie continues, "and write 
about wife swapping." These protests, slurs, and feuds, the signs 
and symptoms of a post 9/11 culture war, pale in comparison though 
when one considers the fraught production history of Paradise Now 
at ground level. Indeed, if filmmaking and other visual technologies 
have now become an integral part of both violent resistance culture 
and reportage, from the dissemination of martyrdom videos as a 
recruitment tool to mobile phone footage of war crimes, then the 
actual making of Abu-Assad's film can be seen as bound up with the 
very struggle it delineates for the viewer. The production endured 
everything from Israeli rocket strikes (which prompted a sizeable 
portion of the European technical crew to abandon filming) to the 
kidnapping of the location manager by an armed faction.14 
While these texts are profoundly removed from one another in 
many respects, they are also bound together in a number of arresting 
and unexpected ways. From a broad perspective, we might argue that 
novels and films, in a generic sense, are modes of representation that 
embody the antagonism between the local and the global (an antago-
nism that enframes the act of suicide terror) like nothing else—as 
mass market commodities, as agents of imperialism or resistance, as 
barometers of regional-national cultures, and as the regular source 
of international political controversy. (Who better than Rushdie, then, 
to provide the most brutal assessment of Updike's dalliance with ter-
rorism?) More specifically, it has already been established that both 
Terrorist and Paradise Now attempt to provide a cohesive psychologi-
cal portrait of the would-be suicide bomber and both are constructed 
according to a logic of empathetic identification. With this question 
of empathy in mind, the polarized (though similarly hot-blooded) 
responses to these texts are doubly revealing. Ahmad, for instance, 
the boy Levy calls "'a kind of minority's minority'" (84), has been 
roundly dismissed by many reviewers—with varying degrees of op-
probrium—as an automaton or robot. For some, he is little more than 
a crude "Muslim metonymy" (Abell), a "static and one-dimensional" 
cliché from a "bad action adventure movie" (Kakutani), an avatar, 
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perhaps, of the clash of civilizations (although technically speaking 
Ahmad's background is, in a sense, a prototypically American story, 
an old-fashioned tale of the melting pot, and he has never left the 
United States). Indeed, Ahmad is a figure whose self-cultivated faith 
is so singular and mechanical that "he feels his pride of isolation . . . 
to be threatened by the masses of ordinary, hard-pressed men and 
plain, practical women who are enrolled in Islam as a lazy matter of 
ethnic identity" (177). In other words, for all the novel's explicit (and, 
it must be said, somewhat hackneyed) efforts to unravel the inner 
workings of a suicide bomber, Terrorist has been criticized for failing 
to provide a character who is sufficiently human and who shows little 
or no signs of the fact he was born and raised in New Jersey—for all 
the local features that Updike emphasizes—rather than some kind of 
imaginary Jihadi training camp. "Devils," reads the novel's opening 
line, "These devils seek to take away my God," thus sealing Ahmad's 
war against the poisonous material world that surrounds him from the 
very outset of the narrative (3). The empathy this text proffers, it is 
implicitly suggested by Updike's critics, becomes an empty gesture in 
the hands of a white Presbyterian bourgeois aesthete, no matter how 
finely observed the novel's details might be—beads of sweat, tension 
headaches, teenage hard-ons and swollen bladders, all rendered in 
the author's characteristically measured and glassy prose. 
In addition to these criticisms, given the fact that the novel is 
studded with diligently researched references to Islamic doctrine and 
controversial suras, it is sorely tempting to invoke Žižek's shrewd 
analysis of the massive increase in sales of English translations of 
the Qur'an in the weeks after 9/11: 
Sympathetic as this attitude may be (and what can be more 
ethically appealing than, in the midst of violent confron-
tation, trying to put oneself inside the opponent's mind, 
and thus to relativize one's own standpoint?), it remains a 
gesture of ideological mystification par excellence: probing 
into different cultural traditions is precisely not the way to 
grasp the political dynamics which led to the September 11 
attacks. Is not the fact that Western leaders, from Bush to 
Netanyahu to Sharon, repeat like a mantra how Islam is a 
great religion . . . a clear sign that something about this 
praise is wrong? (Welcome 34) 
What Žižek is describing here is a sort of radical depoliticitization of 
the events and systems (both local and global) which converged to 
such devastating effect in the 9/11 attacks and, directly related to 
this, the critical limits of a supposedly tolerant idiom that fetishistically 
overvalues the importance of coming to terms with contrasting "cul-
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tural traditions." Explanations that insist on "social circumstances," 
he contends, are "dismissed as covert justification[s] of terror" (33) 
and thus give way to aestheticized desire "to give Islam a chance, to 
get a feel for it, to experience it from the inside, and thus redeem it" 
(34). If Updike's novel can dodge the charge of outright Islamophobia 
(and indeed clichéd writing) brought against it by various critics, then 
its potential failings can be illuminated in a more sophisticated way 
within this framework. In decorating the narrative with reverential 
borrowings from the Qur'an and conspicuously knowing references 
to Arabic culture more generally, it could be argued that Terrorist 
projects "a patronizingly liberal respect for the Other's spiritual depth" 
(34)—channelling the kind of "understanding," kiss-and-kill rhetoric 
perhaps best embodied by a figure like Tony Blair, apparently a long-
time student of Islam's holy book, and one of the key architects of 
the post-9/11 War on Terror (a figure whom Žižek rather mysteriously 
omits from his list). Fear and bewilderment, not to mention certain 
prejudices and value judgements, are sublimated into an outward 
gesture of compassion or inclusivity—a process that is played out in 
Terrorist at the level of textuality itself, traceable in its very composi-
tion, encoded in the novel's liberal-conservative DNA.
If Ahmad lacks humanity, then the opposite appears to be the 
case with Abu-Assad's work. His portrayal of suicide bombers has 
been condemned in the Israeli media on the charge of "humanizing 
terror," for "making the worst monsters look human." While this 
outrage is predictable, it is nonetheless worthy of further analysis. 
Decrying Abu-Assad's temerity in presenting us with so-called "sym-
pathetic terrorists," an editorial in The Jerusalem Post offers the 
following critique:
The theaters in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem that showed the 
film, like almost every public place, routinely employ 
guards to prevent attacks of precisely the sort that the 
film portrayed—from the bombers' perspective—on the 
screen. Hence the concern is not over historical accuracy 
and perspective, but propagandizing for terrorism in the 
present and future. Two years ago, Israeli Ambassador Zvi 
Mazel purposely damaged an art installation in Sweden 
that depicted a Palestinian suicide bomber as Snow White 
floating on a sea of blood—an undiplomatic act that was 
met with near universal cheers in Israel. Paradise Now 
humanizes mass murderers even more forthrightly, and 
to a much wider audience. Those who would heap awards 
on such a film should, even if they are unconcerned by the 
sensibilities of Israelis, consider whether they would make 
the same choice if they—their nation or their families—were 
the victims. ("Humanizing")
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In short, the film has been accused of actively condoning terrorist 
violence, with the final comments here designed as a reminder that 
suicide terrorism is simultaneously a local and a global problem, as 
well as perhaps appealing to some generalized sense of the wounded 
American psyche after 9/11. Reading between the lines, there is an 
emotionally manipulative hidden message being projected here: 
"Remember that these terrible crimes do not just happen in the 
Middle East . . . Have you already forgotten your own recent past?" 
The film has also earned the dubious honor of being listed on the 
hateful, notoriously Islamophobic Jihad Watch website. This alleged 
"glorification" of terrorism climaxes with the film's unbearable final 
sequence—a long close-up shot of Sayeed sitting on a bus crowded 
with uniformed Israelis. He is freshly committed to the Cause after a 
crisis of both conscience and will (committed to the immanent tran-
scendence it promises, to the dialectical synthesis of the personal and 
the political, and indeed the secular and the religious, on which it is 
predicated), clean shaven and dressed in sharp black suit so as to 
resemble a settler. The camera moves ever closer before fixing itself 
on Sayeed's eyes for twenty long seconds; he stares intently for-
ward, his expression strangely unreadable. The screen then abruptly 
dissolves into a white nothingness at the very moment he is due to 
detonate the bomb strapped to his chest. Moreover, Abu-Assad even 
dares to find elements of tragicomic, almost Beckettian slapstick in 
these darkest corners of contemporary experience—from the continual 
motif of malfunctioning automobiles, faintly pantomimic symbols of an 
ever-degrading social and economic infrastructure, to the protracted 
scene in which Khaled films his martyrdom video before embarking 
on the mission. Having been asked to repeat his impassioned mes-
sage of holy resistance after the cameraman leaves the lens cap on 
during the first take (which essentially functions as an out-and-out 
gag), Khaled breaks from the script and includes a message for his 
mother about the cheap water filters available from a local store, all 
of which unfolds as Jamal impassively eats pita bread sandwiches. 
The farce, as it were, precedes the tragedy—a largely neglected ele-
ment of Paradise Now that prefigures the audacious Jihadi satire of 
Chris Morris's Four Lions (2010), arguably the first "post-7/7" film 
made in the UK.15
In each of these cases then, the ethical legitimacy of an em-
pathetic approach to terrorism, characterized in terms of lack and 
excess, has been called into question by voices from all sides of a 
literal and metaphorical conflict that now spans the globe. How then 
are we to proceed from this impasse? And what exactly, if we adopt 
the terms of this debate, would constitute an acceptable way of mea-
suring and mediating the humanity of the suicide bomber? As a way 
of moving toward a provisional conclusion, I would first of all like to 
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suggest that this concern over the "humanization" of suicide bombers 
actually functions as a chimera. With regard to Paradise Now, which 
has generated surprisingly little English language scholarship,16 Nouri 
Gana's outstanding reading of the film points the way: 
it would be utterly misguided if film director Abu Assad 
intended to humanize suicide bombers. For what is less 
obviously ironic, but all the more insidious, is that—were 
it indeed compelled by the urge to prove the humanity of 
the suicide bombers—the film would more likely converge 
with, rather than depart from, the logic of the oppressors 
who infinitely urge their victims to prove their humanity. 
The victims acquiesce, but to no avail—terrorists must 
remain terrorists despite piling evidence to the contrary 
. . . What is at stake is not the horror of a film that, if this 
is indeed the case, humanizes suicide bombers; rather, 
it is the bankruptcy of the deeper rationale that sustains 
that horror, namely, the differential allocation of humanity. 
(24–25; emphasis added)
Put another way, the logic that seeks to affirm or deny the human-
ity of the suicide bomber presents us with a false and treacherous 
dichotomy. Contained within such impulses is an oppressive hierar-
chicalism that implicitly provides the phantasmic support for an at-
titude to life in which the collateral damage (and indeed systematic 
dispossession) effected by occupying forces and the deaths caused by 
suicide bombing can both be rationalized. To the ruthless organizers 
of suicide attacks, men and women can be treated, quite literally, as 
living weapons (and therefore already dead meat); to the occupier, 
laws can be suspended and communities harassed, starved, and hu-
miliated in the face of an "inhuman" or "fanatical" enemy. Elements 
of this formula are usefully enacted in both texts, albeit to varying 
degrees. In Updike, what begins as a no doubt earnest attempt to 
reach across cultural boundaries ends up reinscribing many of the 
ideological patterns (or "mystifications" in Žižekian terms) that it at 
least seeks to interrogate if not debunk. It is, in this sense, an instruc-
tive (though no less troubling) failure, perhaps investing too much in 
the novel form's much-trumpeted yet extremely diffuse and unstable 
capacity for a kind of transportative empathy. With Paradise Now, the 
film demonstrates an extraordinary and provocative sensitivity to the 
ways in which the human collapses so very quickly into the inhuman, 
and vice versa, and how faith becomes doubt by subtly hinting at a 
kind of meta reading of its own sociorealist narrative. 
As Gana points out, not only does the repeated image of a 
pot of Arabic coffee overflowing onto a gas stove "craftily preface 
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Khaled's combustible temper and ultimate [planned] explosion" but 
also "the difference in temperament" between the wavering, angst-
ridden Sayeed and the outwardly bullish Khaled "is not as clear cut 
as it might seem since there emerges a subtle allusion that Khaled 
might not be other than a foil to Sayeed, or, simply, his alter-ego." 
This notion "can nuance further an already nuanced ending in which 
the initially hesitant Sayeed transforms into the formerly adamant 
Khaled" (28). It is doubting and fearful Sayeed, after all, who ends 
up on the bus. In fact, Gana's interpretation can be bolstered further 
by noting how they are rendered close to identical in their matching 
black suits and are suggestively shot in near tableau when urinating 
together against a tree or sharing a nargila. The implication that the 
two men represent a single but divided psyche therefore takes on 
an additional significance here. First, and most straightforwardly, the 
relay between certainty and doubt that their relationship embodies—
in contrast to Ahmad's blank single-mindedness—helps to debunk 
the model of "blind faith" that is typically projected onto those who 
answer the call of Islamist militancy. Second, by fusing together in 
this way, the two bombers are reducible neither to some unshake-
able fundamentalism (a simply inaccurate abstraction that Updike's 
text undoubtedly flirts with) nor to an all-consuming, all-justifying 
Palestinian victimhood. Sayeed and Khaled have a choice—this fact 
is never shied away from—but at the same time they cannot, at least 
in one sense, choose the terrain of resistance and the terrain of their 
own lives and deaths, just as they cannot entirely separate from each 
other. As Gana argues, "by settling for the assigned suicide mission 
in Tel Aviv, Sayeed is not oblivious to the fact that he is thus acting 
in line with, not in excess of, the regulating power of the Israeli oc-
cupation" (26). "It's not we who decide," he insists to Suha. If their 
very humanity is a managed commodity, then "it is the occupation 
that decides the space of Man and the space of struggle."
The film's nuances are also enhanced by Abu-Assad's strategic 
(and very sophisticated) play of familiarity and estrangement, a self-
conscious technique that is surely cultivated with the film's Western 
audience in mind—the claustrophobia and dusty decay of Nablus, 
for example, contrasted with the visible affluence and glamour of Tel 
Aviv (gleaming buildings, wide highways, and brightly colored bill-
boards advertising mobile phones and so on). There are also specific 
evocations of canonical and popular images from Western art and 
fiction, a powerfully suggestive quality that is inscribed in the film's 
English title—not only alluding to the "Peace Now" Israeli pressure 
group, long-term advocates of a two state solution, but also to both 
Paradise Lost (1667) and Apocalypse Now (1979). Thus, instead of 
the religious philosophy that so preoccupies Updike in Terrorist, the 
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montage of Sayeed and Khaled's final meal together, for example, 
clearly echoes Da Vinci's famous mural of the Last Supper (there are 
exactly 13 men gathered around the long straight table). The sharp 
black suits and white shirts worn by the two bombers—ostensibly a 
disguise—perhaps even suggest a possible reference to Tarantino's 
Reservoir Dogs (1992). The film therefore appropriates stylized im-
ages of consumable violence and culturally-sanctioned points of em-
pathetic identification but differs from Updike's strategy by rigorously 
problematizing the desire (and therefore highlighting the complicity) 
of the viewer in the act of doing so. It is in this respect very much 
a "post 9/11" work—perhaps more so than the American novel with 
which I have placed it in dialogue—in the sense that formal questions 
about the mediation of violence and what Gana calls "the differen-
tial allocation of humanity" are built into its very structure. The film 
maintains a kind of unreal realism that dramatizes the relationship 
between intersecting death cultures (the symbolic overlap, as it were, 
between the Hollywood spectacular and the destruction of the World 
Trade Center). The videos of martyrdom speeches and executions that 
are available from a local store (fifteen shekels to buy, we are told, 
and three to rent) are a powerful illustration of this—born out of the 
decades of disenfranchisement that defines a specifically Palestinian 
set of experiences and identities, while at the same time plugged into 
a world system of edited terror that implicates us all. 
These details, I would suggest, help us to open up a Jameso-
nian sense of "the missing psychology of the political unconscious," a 
model and metaphor for "how we might begin to articulate the local 
and the global," linking "our particular path through the world" to the 
"crucial features of our geopolitical planet" (McCabe xiv). What I mean 
by this is that by developing the analytical patterns I have begun to 
sketch out here, we can find authentic critical value in lingering over 
a muddled, problematic work such as Updike's Terrorist—adopting 
a geopolitical reading strategy that at the very least moves beyond 
the epiphenomenal feuding that has dominated its reception thus 
far. A kind of double vision is precisely what is required here, exca-
vating the insights that the novel does offer (its useful allegories of 
American social experience and trauma after 9/11) while at the same 
time exposing how the text undermines itself—commits suicide as it 
were—by staging, for instance, an obsessive, fetishistic preoccupation 
with racial physiognomy that weirdly mirrors the kitsch aesthetics 
of mass market consumer choice: faces the color of "cocoa" (8) and 
"caramel" (9), "walnut-furniture stain" (15) and "gingerbread" (118), 
an incessant emphasis on the ethnic differences between Yemeni and 
Lebanese Arabs and so on. In the case of Paradise Now, however, 
we find a way of properly situating suicide terror within the coordi-
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nates of our material and ideological universe—fiercely, intimately, 
violently localized yet dizzyingly, uncomfortably, uncannily bound up 
in globalized power relations, collapsing the safe distance between 
over there and over here. 
To conclude then, for a discussion of means and ends must 
surely provide precisely that, an ending, no matter how makeshift it 
might be, I would highlight an exchange in Abu-Assad's film that I 
think demonstrates the simultaneous levels of meta/materialist re-
flection that the issue of suicide bombing—without ever apologizing 
for it—must always entail. When asked by Suha if he has ever been 
to the movies (the viewer, of course, is quite literally in this posi-
tion and must therefore directly confront the film's ethico-political 
complexity and its multilayered construction), Sayeed gives the fol-
lowing response: "Yes. Once. Ten years ago when we burned down 
the Revoly Cinema." It is then revealed that this act was the violent 
culmination of a protest against Israel's policy of denying work per-
mits to residents of the West Bank. "But why the cinema?" exclaims 
Suha. "Why us?" he replies.
Notes
1. It is hard to imagine a more divergent treatment of, say, Marx and 
his legacies by two contemporary critics of culture and geopolitics 
after 9/11. There is a long distance between Gray's disquieting an-
tihumanism and Žižek's pyrotechnic, rigorously committed defense 
of the "lost cause".
2. To clarify further, one of the challenges of approaching this topic in 
a properly critical fashion is the way in which suicide terrorism (and 
terrorism per se) is both incorporated into and, at the same time, 
stands apart from the systems it might (physically) disrupt and/or 
(ideologically) hold in contempt. Borrowing from the terms used by 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire, I proceed here from the 
standpoint that the networks of global capital that have now all but 
abolished an old-world statism form a totality with those oppositional 
forces that become spectacularly visible in the flashpoint of the ter-
rorist attack. But this opposition is superficial in the sense that "the 
processes of globalization are no longer merely a fact but also a source 
of juridical definitions that tends to project a single supranational 
figure of political power . . . a new notion of right, or rather, a new 
inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms 
and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and re-
solve conflicts" (9). However, as Gopal Balakrishnan explains in his 
review of their influential study, Empire is characterized by a coercive 
but also dynamic, volatile flow of "people, information and wealth" 
(143). Distinct from the familiar models of hegemonic totalization 
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found on the left and right—from, say, the counterintuitive utopian 
pessimism of the Frankfurt School to Francis Fukuyama's infamous 
End of History—the intricate "supranational order which they choose 
to call Empire" describes "a world overflowing with insurgent ener-
gies" (143). 
3. While it is indisputable that terrorism can be conceived of as a nar-
rative process, Alex Houen, for example, attempts to problematize 
the way in which violence and discourse are compounded in certain 
theoretical frameworks: "what about the violence itself? What of its 
own impact on the production of legislation or force of discourse? 
What of its influence in precipitating or terminating political negotia-
tions? It is always textualized in advance, or can it manifest its own 
volatile performativity?" (Terrorism 10; emphasis added).
4. For a sober, detailed overview of both cosmic and "worldly" defini-
tions of jihad in the context of global terrorism see Burke (22–40).
5. Wolin specifically attacks the work of Žižek, Baudrillard and Derrida 
(253–68). 
6. As Judith Butler argues, grief is not always a "privatizing" or "solitary" 
phenomenon. Indeed, it is capable of furnishing "a sense of political 
community of a complex order and it does this first of all by bringing 
to the fore the relational ties that have implications for theorizing 
fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility" (22).
7. Even conservative historians of terror have stressed this point. See, 
for example, Michael Burleigh (392–94). In terms of the origins of 
suicide bombing, while Robert Baer identifies thirteen-year-old Hos-
sein Fahmideh as a specifically "Islamist" prototype, a martyr of the 
Iran-Iraq war who strapped explosives to his chest and threw himself 
under an Iraqi tank in 1980 (Cult 1), the debate rages as to where 
to begin—from medieval assassins to Russian nihilists. 
8. I am fully aware of the argument that "sectarian and national-
ist activists" must be distinguished from "the mythic figure of the 
philosophical nihilist" (Appelbaum and Paknadel 426). Nevertheless, 
Conrad's fiction clearly demonstrates that the social conditions and 
ideological motivations for suicide bombing as we understand it today 
(and, importantly, the technology to carry it out) have been in place 
from at least the turn of the century. Furthermore, it is it important 
to acknowledge that it is Stevie who fits the "profile" of many con-
temporary suicide bombers, in the sense that it is often the young, 
uneducated, vulnerable, and/or mentally ill who are recruited, ut-
terly ruthlessly, as cannon fodder by "cold-eyed operators capable of 
juggling one set of values they apply to their own lives with another 
that sends others to their deaths" (Burleigh 393). 
9. It is interesting to note a stylistic-thematic parallel between Updike 
and Conrad in this respect. Both writers use obesity, or physical bulk, 
as a recurring trope in their discussions of terrorism. Jack Levy's wife 
Beth, for example, is described as "a whale of a woman giving off 
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too much heat through her blubber" (20), curiously reminiscent of 
Conrad's portraits of his grotesque and corpulent anarchists. Broadly 
speaking, it is as if outward rolls of fat reflect an inner failing on the 
part of the individual and society, a moral and spiritual decline. In 
contrast, however, if Conrad's "terrorists" are, quite literally weighed 
down by their shabby physiques, Updike's "terrorist," the athletic 
Ahmad, "has a sense of himself, his long limbs bare, as beautiful, 
beauty being an affront to the brutes of the world" (97). 
10. Early in the novel, in the same moment that Ahmad feels a pang of 
sexual attraction for Joryleen, heavily implied by Updike's roving, 
incessantly biological aesthetic, he "pictures her smooth body . . . 
roasting in that vault of flames and being scorched into blisters" (9). 
11. A tactic, it should not be forgotten, that was first pioneered on Ameri-
can soil by the anarchist Mario Buda, when a wagon full of blasting 
gelatin was detonated on Wall Street in 1920. See Davis (1–4).
12. It must said that one of the novel's most preposterous moments 
comes when Levy, running out of charm and ideas as Ahmad drives 
into the tunnel, announces: "Listen. There's something I need to 
say to you. I fucked your mother" (301)—an uncomfortable case of 
24-meets-Woody Allen. 
13. In fact, all three of the main characters in Paradise Now are marked 
by the death or traumatic wounding or their father: Suha, whose 
father Abu-Azzam is a hero of the Second Intifada and a continual 
absent presence in her life; Sayeed, who attempts to atone for the 
sins of his father and, at the same time, blames Israel for exploiting 
his weakness; and Khaled, whose father walks with a permanent 
limp after Israeli soldiers broke his legs.
14. See Nouri Gana for more information (29).
15. The tragicomic potential of martyrdom video "bloopers" is exploited 
to the nth degree in Morris's contentious film. In an interview with 
the online magazine The Brag, Riz Ahmed (the lead actor) tellingly 
explains how the humor of the film is not, in the strictest sense, a 
whimsical exaggeration: 
The film isn't about, "Let's take a subject that in real life is 
deadly serious and invert it in some farcical way." It's very 
realistic . . . because what we usually get is the boiled-down 
headline that's very serious and drumroll and sensationalist, 
but there's a whole load of bloopers and out-takes either side 
of that headline that we don't see. And of course there are, 
because terrorist cells are groups of guys trying to organise 
something—and groups of guys trying to organise anything 
are going to screw it up.
 This very nuanced conception of the film's comedic dimension is also, 
I would suggest, the key to the film's powerful political conscience.
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16. Alongside Gana, see Raya Morag for an insightful discussion of the 
film's biopolitics in the broader context of Israeli-Palestinian cinema.
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